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INTRODUCTION 
In the process of creating the legal system underpinning 
international trade in the aftermath of World War II, the 
prevailing idea was a continuing liberalization of trade. This in 
turn meant a closer integration of domestic economies.1 One 
way to achieve these ends was what the Preamble to the 1947 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) terms the 
process of “entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade.” 2  While the original GATT regime 
contained rules that allowed for the justification of trade 
barriers under particular circumstances, in Article XX of the 
GATT, the increase in international trade3 prompted a number 
of governments to create barriers other than tariffs or quotas to 
protect the well-being of their populations, mostly from health 
hazards or on environmental grounds. These new measures 
coincided with an increased awareness of the risks that certain 
products or production methods posed to human life or well-
                                                                                                             
1. For a variety of narratives, see Thomas J. Dillon, The World Trade Organization: A 
New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 349, 351–52 (1995); Joost 
Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2005); Daniel 
Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields over Swords, 13 MINN. 
J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 306–07 (2004); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 23 (Butterworth 2d ed., 1990) (1975); JOHN H. JACKSON, 
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 2–3 (Bobbs-Merrill 1969). 
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
3. RAYMOND J. AHEARN & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41291, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO): ISSUES IN THE DEBATE ON CONTINUED U.S. 
PARTICIPATION 3 (2010). 
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being,4 therefore elevating the question of risk regulation to a 
higher level of importance. 
Depending on one’s point of view, these measures were 
either instituted for legitimate reasons, that is for the protection 
of human health or the environment, or they were considered 
to be a second-generation barrier to legitimate international 
trade.5 Thus, domestic regulation, starting in the 1960s, became 
an ever-more important tool for domestic decision-makers. Over 
time, regulation took on a more prominent role than the exact 
tariff placed on a particular product in international 
negotiations. At the same time, influential writings from legal 
scholars and sociologists started to appear popularizing the 
concept of “risk.”6 It was not until the Uruguay Round, however, 
that negotiators finally came to an agreement on rules that 
fleshed out the justifications laid down in the GATT in more 
detail with respect to human, animal, or plant life or health,7 
                                                                                                             
4. Note however that the public’s perception of risks and the scientific evidence 
for risk may substantially diverge. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 
249 SCIENCE 616, 616 (1990). For an earlier article providing similar results across a 
select number of societal subgroups, which shows deviations among them and between 
scientists, see Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281 (1987). 
5. These differing viewpoints were reflected, for example, in the dispute over US 
measures to protect marine life. See Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Doha Declaration and 
Beyond: Giving a Voice to Non-Trade Concerns within the WTO Trade Regime, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 95, 99–100 (2003); Warren H. Maruyama, A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound 
Science, 32 INT’L LAW. 651, 659–61 (1998). The Preamble of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) is also 
indicative in this regard: “Recognizing that developing country Members may 
encounter special difficulties in complying with the sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
of importing Members, and as a consequence in access to markets.” Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 
[hereinafter SPS Agreement]. For further arguments on SPS measures, see generally 
David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: 
An Assessment after Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865 (2000). 
6. Ulrich Beck, in his seminal work RISIKOGESELLSCHAFT, coined the term “risk 
society,” and was one of the first authors to begin a larger public discourse about risk. 
His book appeared in English as ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW 
MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., Sage Publ’ns 1992) (1986); see also NIKLAS LUHMANN, 
RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (Rhodes Barrett trans., 1993). 
7. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl.; Elizabeth Fisher, Beyond the 
Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL 
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 327, 328–29 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006). 
154 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:151 
and international standardization more generally.8 The other 
justifications remained to be fleshed out through the 
jurisprudence of the previous working parties and the newly-
created—and considerably more powerful—dispute settlement 
mechanism under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(“DSU”).9 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) has gained 
particular prominence in this regard since its inception in 1995. 
This is evident through disputes concerning the permissibility of 
using growth hormones in raising beef 10  or the use of 
genetically-modified organisms in the production of food and 
feed.11 While the SPS Agreement makes specific mention of the 
role that science plays in ascertaining the existence of risk for 
the establishment or maintenance of trade restricting measures, 
such evidence is not unfamiliar to other parts of World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) law, especially in the environmental 
field. While one could be excused for thinking that a science-
based approach would lead to a decrease in substantive disputes 
and a decline in arbitrary decision-making on the domestic level, 
the track record since 1995 is mixed at best. Questions remain 
about what constitutes scientific evidence, whether WTO 
members can rely on a minority scientific opinion or have to 
adhere to what is considered to be the majority scientific 
opinion, whether non-scientific factors can play a role, and, 
importantly, to what extent scientific questions that are not fully 
researched or where only preliminary scientific evidence exists 
can be taken into account. WTO dispute settlement organs have 
therefore been tasked with interpreting terms such as “available 
scientific evidence” or to determine whether a particular set of 
                                                                                                             
8. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 
[hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
9. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 14 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
10. Panel Report, EC–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC–Hormones]. 
11. Panel Report, EC-–Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter 
Panel Report, EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products].  
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information presents “insufficient evidence” for the 
maintenance of a trade restrictive measure. Although most 
adjudicators are not trained scientists, they find themselves 
applying legal language and categorizations to complicated 
scientific conclusions. 
This Article attempts to understand the regulatory 
philosophy that underlies the jurisprudence of the WTO in the 
field of risk regulation in the context of the SPS Agreement. 
While taking account of the interpretative methods of WTO 
dispute settlement, the focus of this Article is on two separate 
but interrelated aspects: First, Part I of this Article explains the 
distinct languages and methodologies that science, on the one 
hand, and law, on the other, use. After reviewing the treaty 
language and the existing WTO jurisprudence in Part II, Part III 
turns to the different methods or “transmission belts” that can 
be used to translate scientific insights, or lack thereof, into legal 
categories. Part IV makes the second substantive point by 
analyzing the panels’ and the Appellate Body’s (“AB”) 
underlying jurisprudential view of risk regulation. It 
demonstrates that the approach taken by the panel level differs 
considerably from that taken by the AB, thus making it more 
difficult to find a coherent legal framework for these questions. 
Finally, Part V provides a summary of the findings and draws 
conclusions. 
I. THE LANGUAGES OF SCIENCE AND LAW 
The starting point for the present inquiry is the distinction 
between the languages and methods that both science and law 
use as a matter of course in their respective disciplines. While it 
is natural that a particular discipline develops its own 
approaches, methodology, and specific language to express 
ideas and rationales, this development also leads to a dichotomy 
of conversations when actors in one field (try to) communicate 
with those from an unrelated discipline.12 As will be pointed out 
in greater detail below, certain provisions of the SPS Agreement, 
as well as other parts of WTO law, either explicitly or impliedly 
mandate the use of scientific evidence in order to justify 
                                                                                                             
12. See generally Robin Feldman, Historic Perspectives on Law & Science, 2009 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1 (discussing the law’s misunderstanding of science). 
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domestic measures that limit or prohibit in their entirety the 
importation of particular goods. Thus, not only the design of 
the SPS Agreement, but also the increased awareness of risks to 
either health or the environment in more general terms, 
mandate a bridging of disciplines that employ different 
languages and methodologies. 
A. The Language of Science 
Science has been described as being “progressive,” 
employing “methods designed to approach a better 
understanding over time.”13 The “object” of scientific inquiry is 
“to figure out answers to questions about the world and how it 
works.”14 This signifies an evolutionary methodology: knowledge 
is acquired through a succession of inquiries, which ideally verify 
a particular observation made or confirm a theoretical assertion. 
In at least the majority of cases, this also means that having 
found a particular answer, or in some cases, failure to do so, may 
pave the way for additional questions that require additional 
research. 
Moreover, two interrelated aspects characterize scientific 
investigation: it is by nature an open-ended inquiry process that 
at least in theory must always be revisable.15 Under a different set 
of circumstances there is at least a logical possibility that a 
particular assertion could be falsified. Secondly, the tools and 
techniques that are being used to gain a more thorough 
understanding of a particular phenomenon are themselves 
subject to change. This change may in turn yield a different 
understanding, either because the results are more refined or 
yield different conclusions altogether. 
Importantly, there is no single “scientific method” that can 
be followed in a formalized way and none that guarantees 
additional insights.16 That in turn means that each field may 
have their own discreet and distinct procedure that yields the 
best results. For example, the differences between physics and 
                                                                                                             
13. Douglas Crawford-Brown et al., Environmental Risk, Precaution, and Scientific 
Rationality in the Context of WTO/NAFTA Trade Rules, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 461, 462 (2004). 
14. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 7 (2009). 
15. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 281 (1992). 
16. Haack, supra note 14, at 8. 
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biology are instructive. While the former has been called “a 
breathtaking example of mathematical elegance combined with 
fantastically accurate predictions,” the latter is characterized by 
the central paradigm of evolution giving the field a higher 
degree of complexity.17 Because of this complexity “no one 
seems to think that [the features of this complexity] can be 
predicted in any detail on the basis of a deductive theory.”18 
Over time, a particular field of science may thus attain a 
common and shared understanding of the underpinnings of its 
discipline. Such a consensus—be it one that supports an 
assertion that was originally thought of as being invalid or be it 
one that was originally embraced but which turned out to be 
insupportable in the end—arises not by formal voting but only 
as a byproduct when enough members of the relevant scientific 
subcommunity come to regard the evidence as strong enough to 
warrant this claim or that theory.”19 Note that already at this 
stage, the idea that science is an objective or neutral arbiter of 
disputes can be questioned. The very idea of a particular 
hypothesis being accepted through members of a community is 
itself a value-laden judgment.20 
As will be laid out in greater detail below, science itself is 
ideally policy-neutral. This is, of course, not to say that science is 
not policy-relevant, but rather that scientific inquiry is 
disinterested in the policy outcome that follows any revelation, 
through publication or otherwise, of the results of the scientific 
inquiry. All of this leads to conclusions that are stated in rather 
cautious terms.21 Statements may thus be preceded by “there is 
some evidence that” or “there is no acceptable evidence that.”22 
                                                                                                             
17. Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 295 
(2001).  
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 10. Or, as Paul Feyerabend writes, “[s]cience is an essentially anarchistic 
enterprise.” PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 17 (Verso 1978) (1975). 
20. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN 
SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 320–39 (1977); Richard Rudner, The Scientist Qua 
Scientist Makes Value Judgments, 20 PHIL. SCI. 1, 4 (1953). 
21. Richard Wilson & E.A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An 
Introduction, 236 SCIENCE 267, 268 (1987). 
22. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 48 (1993); see also Ernan McMullin, Values in Science, in INTRODUCTORY 
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 515, 519–20 (E.D. Klemke et al. eds., 1998). 
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This has led scientists to argue that in order to relay as full an 
understanding as possible, risk may have to be expressed “in as 
many different ways as possible.”23 
B. The Language of Law 
Law employs both a different language and a different 
methodology. As expressed by Justice Blackmun in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., “there are important 
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and 
the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are 
subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must 
resolve disputes finally and quickly.”24 
This passage from Daubert summarizes some of the 
differences between the worlds of science and law.25 Language is 
one of the central elements for legal adjudication. It makes a 
difference whether a sentence contains an “and” as opposed to 
an “or;” it affects the outcome of a decision whether a text 
contains the indefinite article “a” or the definite article “the.”26 
The legal process also has a different objective: the 
resolution of a particular conflict between two or more parties at 
a particular moment in time. Unlike science, a plethora of rules 
exist to guide the procedure in adjudicatory processes—for 
example, the exclusion of potentially relevant evidence, which 
of the parties carries the burden of proof, and how much time a 
party has to establish an assertion made.27 By definition and due 
to their forthcoming, these rules are themselves value-laden. 
Sometimes they are extrinsic, having nothing at all to do with a 
neutral inquiry into the truth. An example in the realm of 
criminal law is the exclusion of evidence that was acquired 
                                                                                                             
23. Wilson & Crouch, supra note 21, at 270. 
24. 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993). 
25. Note that WTO law differs in important respects in that it does not possess the 
strict binary nature of cases such as Daubert. Panel and AB decisions are often 
characterized by including wide-ranging policy decisions and thus far larger 
implications than for the immediate case to be decided. 
26. One of the more famous examples in public international law is the debate 
surrounding a resolution by the United Nations Security Council concerning the 
situation in Israel. See generally LORD CARADON ET AL., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 242, A CASE STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC AMBIGUITY 22, 46 (1981); SYDNEY D. 
BAILEY, THE MAKING OF RESOLUTION 242 at 152–58 (1985). 
27. Crawford-Brown et al., supra note 13, at 462; Haack, supra note 14, at 13. 
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improperly, such as if the prosecution were to obtain evidence 
in an unlawful manner or withhold evidence from the defense. 
The role of the lawyer, having to act in the best interest of 
the client, is in almost complete contradistinction to that of a 
disinterested scientist. If the latter is an inquirer, starting out 
with a question to answer, the former is an advocate, trying to 
persuade the adjudicator of a particular position and trying to 
provide as many arguments in support thereof as possible. While 
the role of a judge is by design more neutral, a judge still 
operates in an environment where the search for truth is—often 
for good reasons—constrained. The character of adversarial 
judicial proceedings in which the parties furnish the experts 
implies the use of scientific experts who may express more 
certainty than the scientific underpinnings would allow. This 
means that looking at expert testimony on a spectrum, with the 
representatives on the outer bounds claiming certainty for their 
own—often mutually contradictory—opinions, genuine 
scientific debate tends to happen in the center where certainty is 
muted, positions not fully contradictory and representatives at 
least open to accepting another fellow scientist’s assessment.28 
Court proceedings—and this is especially true in the case of 
the WTO29—are characterized by time limits that emphasize the 
resolution of the conflict at hand within a reasonable period. 
Moreover, legal decisions are considered to be definitive—at 
least once all options for appeals have been exhausted. An 
individual decision thus has an inherent element of finality, one 
that—very much unlike the scientific process—does not evolve 
or change over time.30  
                                                                                                             
28. For an analysis of how the adversarial legal system has a tendency to make 
experts appear to be certain about scientifically contestable findings, see Haack, supra 
note 14, at 16. 
29. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 200, 287–88 (2d ed. 2008). Under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) rules, panel proceedings are to be 
finished in less than nine months, Appellate Body (“AB”) proceedings are not to last 
longer than ninety days. Both timeframes are regularly exceeded. See id.; Timing of 
Appeal, Circulation and Adoption of Appellate Body Reports, WORLDTRADELAW.NET, 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/abtiming.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).  
30. The finality of a particular dispute stands in contrast to the evolving long-term 
development of legal doctrines and which, depending on the legal sysem, can have a 
considerable impact on subsequent decision-making. Such an evolution may respond 
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C. The Significance of the Debate 
The relevance of this disparity becomes evident in 
situations where a scientific expert is called to testify before a 
body tasked with making decisions based on legal rules. 
Challenges arise in a variety of circumstances. 
Questions posed by an adjudicator may be based on legal 
logic and may lack an understanding of how the scientific 
process works. This became evident in the panel proceedings in 
United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–
Hormones Dispute (“US–Continued Suspension”).31  At numerous 
points in the hearing, the panel members indicate their 
unfamiliarity with the scientific process. For example, one of the 
panelists asked: “I take it then that the answer is there is no new 
scientific information that would fundamentally change what 
was already analysed in the 1999 review.” 32  The expert’s 
response pointed out that he could not answer that question 
with a sufficient degree of certainty,33 and was again pressed by 
another panelist on that point.34 It is imperative that panelists 
understand the process of scientific experimentation and what 
weight is to be given to empirical data in the face of uncertainty 
about the explanatory effect of a particular theory. Scientists, on 
the other hand, may understand a question concerned with 
legal categorization on purely scientific terms, therefore leaving 
out information that would otherwise be considered important. 
A statement by an expert to the effect that she or he cannot 
attest to whether a particular substance or a process is 
dangerous or whether a particular outcome is solely based on 
the introduction of one particular substance could be 
interpreted ambiguously. Even a statement such as “I do not 
know” may have a different meaning. It may simply imply that 
there is not enough information—the appropriate response to 
which is most likely not to ignore something simply because it is 
                                                                                                             
to changing societal attitudes or scientific insights as well as the introduction of new 
methods of evidence gathering.  
31. See generally Panel Report, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the 
EC–Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/R (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Panel Report, US–
Continued Suspension]. 
32. Id., Annex G, ¶ 656. 
33. Id. ¶ 662. 
34. Id. ¶ 663. 
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not a proven hazard.35 For a scientist, his or her statement would 
necessarily be understood to have validity only under the 
conditions under which the particular experiment was 
conducted. This means that scientific testimony is rarely 
unqualified, but rather inherently limited. The language of law, 
on the other hand, is absolute and usually employs a binary 
decision-making process because something must be considered 
to be either legal or illegal. Individuals being tasked with making 
legal decisions are therefore put into a position to ascertain the 
language of scientists and translate it into one of the two legal 
categories. One can arguably claim that, for example, the 
principle of proportionality or the requirement to take 
extenuating circumstances into account in criminal proceedings 
can ameliorate inequitable or wholly unfair outcomes. But even 
before reaching that particular stage in the decision-making 
process, the different languages may have already paved the way 
for a legal conclusion to which a scientist may not have 
imagined a particular statement could lead.36 
An additional challenge presents itself in situations in 
which scientists differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from a 
particular set of scientific data. As was true in all decisions in the 
WTO context concerning the use of scientific evidence, the 
opposing parties to the dispute presented expert testimony as to 
the viability of their respective positions.37 In such situations, 
                                                                                                             
35. See Wilson & Crouch, supra note 21, at 267–68. 
36 . This is not to say that legal decisions are never complex. Oftentimes, 
adjudicatory processes take a long time and complicated issues must be resolved. This 
may be gleaned, in the context of WTO law, from the increasing time it takes to reach a 
decision at both the panel and the AB stage. For a detailed account of the timing 
involved at the AB stage, see Timing of Appeal, Circulation and Adoption of Appellate Body 
Reports, supra note 29. No matter how complex a particular decision-making process 
may have been, however, the ultimate decision a court makes is of a binary nature. 
37. See Panel Report, Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Australia–Salmon]; Panel 
Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10; Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Panel 
Report, EC–Hormones (Canada)]; Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products, WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan–Agricultural 
Products II]; Panel Report, Japan–Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 
WT/DS245/R (July 15, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Japan–Apples]; Panel Report, 
EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 11; Panel Report, US–
Continued Suspension, supra note 31. The relevant AB reports are Appellate Body 
Report, Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, (Oct. 20, 
1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon]; Appellate Body Report, 
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scientific experts may disagree on the facts underlying the case 
or may have differing views as to the certainty of particular 
statements in light of the evidence that they or others could 
find. They may also differ as to how much weight to give factors 
such as direct empirical evidence, semi-empirical evidence, 
empirical correlation, theory-based inference, or even existential 
insight.38 An adjudicator may end up in the unenviable position 
of nevertheless having to make a finding as to the legality of a 
particular trade measure without being able to rely on a 
sufficient amount of certainty. 
A statement by a scientist as to the inability to attest to the 
toxicity of a certain substance may thus be understood by a non-
scientist WTO member as operating “without sufficient 
evidence.” As will be seen in the next section, such a lack of 
understanding of the scientific process can have a significant 
impact on, and in some instances can determine, the outcome 
of cases in WTO proceedings. 
An additional element complicates matters in cases before 
the WTO dispute settlement organs. As has been pointed out 
numerous times, the AB has employed a textual approach to 
interpreting WTO treaty language. 39  Ostensibly based on 
                                                                                                             
European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body 
Report, EC–Hormones]; Appellate Body Report, Japan–Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Japan–
Agricultural Products II]; Appellate Body Report, Japan–Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, 
Japan–Apples]; Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in 
the EC–Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Appellate 
Body Report, US–Continued Suspension]. 
38. Crawford-Brown et al., supra note 13, at 465. Arguably, at least, the last 
element, which is “rooted in a purely subjective judgment of risk,” is no longer part of 
a strict scientific process, but rather a conclusory aspect as to how to manage a risk that 
has been identified. Id. For more detail, see DOUGLAS J. CRAWFORD-BROWN, RISK-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: CULTURE AND METHODS 52–53 (1999). 
39. See, e.g., David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of 
Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 398 (1998); Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty 
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local 
Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 302 (2010); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six 
Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court:” Some Personal Experiences as Member of the 
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 616 (2002); 
Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US-Gambling: 
A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 122–24 (2006); Michael Lennard, Navigating by the 
Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 87 (2002). 
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Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties40 
and, arguably more importantly, out of concern for the 
legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement process in its infant 
stage,41 the AB’s interpretation has been characterized by an 
explicit reliance on dictionaries for definitional purposes and by 
avoiding other means of interpretation as much as possible. It 
thus stands in marked contrast to other judicial institutions on 
the international plane, most of all the jurisprudential approach 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union.42 It has been 
argued that this approach is nothing but a mask or a “pretense” 
and that “any critical reading of the case law will show that when 
it appears fit the AB is no less teleological, contextual, or 
systematic than any other tribunal of similar standing.”43 The 
problem then is that (overly) strong reliance on a textual 
approach comes at the expense of “the richer contextual matrix 
of its decisions”44 and potentially an inability to take account of 
the wider background before which science operates. 
II. WTO LAW AND RISK SCIENCE: THE SPS AGREEMENT 
The SPS Agreement 45 —under which members are 
permitted to take measures to protect, within their own 
                                                                                                             
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
41. For more information on sources of legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement 
process, see Yuka Fukunaga, Civil Society and the Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 85, 111–12 (2008). 
42. See Ehlermann, supra note 39, at 616. 
43. Henrik Horn & Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities—Trade Description 
of Sardines: Textualism and Its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002 248, 252 
(Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2005). 
44. Id. at 255.  
45. This section outlines the pertinent legal issues with regard to the SPS 
Agreement. Other agreements contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement face 
similar challenges, notably the questions dealt with in this section also appear in the 
jurisprudence of Article XX of the GATT. Furthermore, similar questions pertaining to 
the assessment of risk to the economy of a WTO member (and therefore not human, 
animal, or plant life or health) also arise in the context of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S 201, as well as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. These may necessitate a different approach 
when dealing with such risks. 
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territory, the life and health of humans, animals, and plants 
from, inter alia, pests, diseases, additives, and contaminants—
employs a science-based approach for the invocation of trade-
restricting measures.46 
The SPS Agreement explicitly mandates that measures 
instituted by WTO members be “based on scientific principles” 
and that they are “not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence.” 47  Members are strongly encouraged to follow 
international standards in developing internal measures.48 The 
use of such standards creates a presumption of compliance with 
the terms of the SPS Agreement, and any deviation must be 
specifically justified on the part of the country opting for a 
higher level of protection than that set forth in the international 
standard.49 Thus, the SPS Agreement allows for a deviation from 
international standards, provided that there is “a scientific 
justification” and provided that the additional requirements 
under Article 5 of the SPS Agreement are met. 50  These 
requirements include carrying out a risk assessment,51 in the 
process of which members “shall take into account available 
scientific evidence.”52 Provisional measures may be taken “where 
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient,” but “[m]embers shall 
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk . . . within a reasonable period of 
time.”53 
A. Scientific Justification 
Given the overarching ideal of the WTO, laid down, for 
example, as the “elimination of discriminatory treatment,”54 it is 
                                                                                                             
46. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 1, for the definition of an SPS 
measure. 
47. Id. art. 2.2. 
48. See, e.g., id. art. 3 . 
49. See id. art. 3.3. 
50. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶¶ 237–45, 
(discussing the need for “scientific evidence” and a risk assessment meeting Article 5’s 
requirements).  
51. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.1. 
52. Id. art. 5.2. 
53. Id. art. 5.7. 
54. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl. 3, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. Similar language can be found in the Preamble of 
the SPS Agreement. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl. (requiring that measures 
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not surprising that SPS measures must be taken on a rational 
basis. While Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement allows WTO 
members to take SPS measures, Article 2.2 SPS Agreement 
mandates that this be done with a considerable amount of 
scrutiny. It sets a limit on the breadth of the measure (“only to 
the extent necessary”) including a proportionality requirement 
and requires that any measure be based on “scientific principles 
and . . . not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.” 55 
While the case law has clarified the provision to some extent, the 
exact relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.1 is still not 
clear.56 In its case law, the AB pointed out that the two provisions 
should be read in conjunction with one another, as Article 5.1 
was found to be a “specific application of the basic obligations 
contained in Article 2.2.”57 
What emerges from the case law is the following: the term 
“scientific evidence” was interpreted, relying on dictionary 
definitions, as meaning “‘of, relating to, or used in science,’ 
‘broadly, having or appearing to have an exact, objective, 
factual, systematic or methodological basis,’ ‘of, relating to, or 
exhibiting the methods or principles of science’ and ‘of, 
pertaining to, using, or based on the methodology of science.’”58 
While these definitions are not necessarily satisfactory, the more 
problematic element of the term is the word “sufficient.”59 
According to the AB, the term implies a “relational concept” 
and requires “the existence of a sufficient or adequate 
relationship . . . between the SPS measure and the scientific 
evidence.”60 In a subsequent case, the AB attempted to clarify 
this finding by stating that the relationship needs to be “rational 
                                                                                                             
not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination”). 
55. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 2.1, 2.2; Anja Seibert-Fohr, Article 2 SPS, 
in 3 MAX PLANCK COMMENTARIES ON WORLD TRADE LAW: WTO-TECHNICAL BARRIERS 
AND SPS MEASURES ¶¶ 12, 17–18 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2007). 
56. See Lukasz Gruszczynski, Science in the Process of Risk Regulation under the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 7 GER. L.J. 371, 375–77 (2006). 
57. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 180. This ruling was 
confirmed in Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 82. 
58. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187, ¶ 187 n.172. 
59 . See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2 (“[N]ot maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence . . . .”); SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.7 (“In cases 
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient . . . .”). 
60. Appellate Body Report, Japan– Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 73. 
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or objective,” requiring verifiable data to support the 
conclusions arrived at, 61  which, in turn, requires at least a 
“certain level of objectivity.” 62  Without prejudice to the 
precautionary principle contained in Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement, this would imply that the more trade-restrictive a 
measure is, the higher the evidentiary threshold. On the other 
hand, the AB went to great lengths to point out that even at this 
stage of the process, panels should take account of the fact that 
“responsible, representative governments commonly act from 
perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of 
irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are 
concerned.”63 
B. Higher Level of Protection Requires Scientific Justification 
The SPS Agreement presumes that a country is in 
compliance with its disciplines if a member’s measures are 
“based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations.” 64  It therefore seeks to harmonize the 
application of domestic SPS measures with international 
standards.65 These standards, guidelines, and recommendations 
are not elaborated on by the WTO, but rather, Annex A(3) of 
the SPS Agreement refers to specific organizations in their 
respective fields. 66  At the same time, the SPS Agreement 
recognizes—at least on its face—regulatory autonomy for WTO 
                                                                                                             
61. Id. ¶ 114. 
62. Panel Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 7.48. 
63. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124. 
64. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.3. 
65. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World 
Trade Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 55, 
57 (1999); Victor, supra note 5, at 875. 
66. The relevant organizations are: 
[F]or food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established 
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary 
drug and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, 
and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice; for animal health and 
zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under 
the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics; for plant health, the 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under 
the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection 
Convention in cooperation with regional organizations operating within the 
framework of the International Plant Protection Convention . . . . 
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A ¶ 3(a)–(c). 
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members: the agreement allows members to impose measures 
that result in a higher level of SPS protection, under the 
condition that the member provides a scientific justification for 
the deviation or its measure comports with the strictures of 
Article 5.67 
The early case law left uncertainties over whether Article 
3.3 allowed for these two alternatives.68 The more permissive 
interpretation would have allowed members significantly more 
decisional autonomy and would have alleviated the members 
from the rather onerous requirements under Article 5. This 
uncertainty was criticized by the AB in EC–Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (“EC-Hormones”) when it said 
that “Article 3.3 is evidently not a model of clarity in drafting 
and communication.”69 The AB provided that clarity in the same 
decision by eviscerating the provision of all independent 
meaning. The disjunctive “or” was effectively turned into a 
conjunctive “and.”70 It based its decision on the last sentence of 
Article 3.3, which provides that higher levels of SPS protection 
“shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this 
Agreement,” as well as the text of the footnote in the official text 
which was held to essentially embody the requirements of Article 
5 of the SPS Agreement.71 
C. Dealing with Risk 
Scientific evidence is therefore the lynchpin of compliance 
with the SPS Agreement should a WTO member decide to 
deviate from the international standard in a particular area. It 
must then carry out a risk assessment under Articles 5.1–5.3, the 
intensity of which depends on what type of measure is at issue. 
Early panel decisions 72  and some commentators 73 
distinguish between two stages in the process of how to deal with 
                                                                                                             
67. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.3. 
68. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 175. 
69. See id. ¶ 175. 
70. See id. ¶¶ 175, 177. 
71. See id. ¶ 175; SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.3. 
72. See, e.g., Panel Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.94–8.98; 
Panel Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.91–8.95.  
73. See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 29, at 852–62; Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael 
J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 
MCGILL L.J. 835, 849 (1998); Christian Joerges, Law, Science and the Management of Risks 
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risk by separating the risk assessment from risk management. 
This distinction existed in domestic mechanisms, for example in 
the United States, well before it appeared in WTO 
jurisprudence. 74  In the US context, the former is—in an 
idealized form—understood to mean a “characterization of the 
potential adverse health effects of human exposures to 
environmental hazards.”75 Risk management is the second step 
and means a “process of identifying, evaluating, selecting, and 
implementing actions to reduce risk to human health and to 
ecosystems. The goal of risk management is to create 
scientifically sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that reduce 
or prevent risks while taking into account social, cultural, 
ethical, political, and legal considerations.”76 
The same approach was taken by the Panel in response to 
the US and Canadian complaints in EC–Hormones, which drew a 
distinction between the two phases of risk assessment and risk 
management,77 a move roundly rejected by the AB. The Panel 
drew what it saw as a clear distinction between the two stages. 
Risk assessment, defined as “a scientific examination of data and 
factual studies,” is unlike risk management because it is “not a 
policy exercise involving social value judgments made by 
political bodies.” 78  Risk management “involves social value 
                                                                                                             
to Health at the National, European and International Level—Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad 
Cows and Hormones in Beef, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 15 (2001); Vern R. Walker, Keeping the 
WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science 
Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 251, 255, 
267–77 (1998). 
74. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO 
PUB. HEALTH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 18–19 (1983). Note however that the 
Committee was aware that its separation between risk assessment and risk management 
could be undermined by policy considerations. See id. at 33–37; see also BREYER, supra 
note 22, at 9; WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 8 (1976). 
75. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. 
HEALTH, supra note 74, at 18. The document points out that this definition has not 
been universally accepted, with critics contending that risk assessment should only take 
account of quantitative elements as opposed to qualitative factors. Id. 
76 . 1 PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT., 
FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT 1 (1997). 
77. See Panel Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.94–8.100; Panel 
Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8.91–8.160.  
78. Panel Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶¶ 8.97, 8.163; Panel 
Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8.94, 8.160.  
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judgments” such that “[o]nce the risks have been assessed, i.e., 
once the risks and their probability of occurrence [are] 
identified, a Member will need to decide, on the basis of its own 
value judgments, whether it can accept these risks.”79 The AB, 
however, rejected this understanding on two grounds: 1) it 
found no basis in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, nor in any 
other provision, for this distinction;80 2) it understood Article 
5.2, which indicates factors to be taken into account in assessing 
the risk, to be an open-ended list.81 Its approach recognized, as 
mentioned above, that the measures contemplated by members 
did not take place in a laboratory, but rather in “human 
societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual 
potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world 
where people live and work and die.”82 This interpretation itself 
is not free from criticism. While it broadened the scope of 
factors that may be taken into consideration and allowed for a 
more holistic approach, it also deviated from the language of 
Article 2.2, which provides context to Articles 5.1 through 5.3,83 
and which demands that SPS measures be based on “sufficient 
scientific evidence.”84 
Whether this means that non-scientific factors, including 
cultural or subjective factors that shape the perceptions of risk, 
can be taken into account in the decision-making process 
leading up to the institution of the measure85 was not addressed 
                                                                                                             
79. Id.  
80. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 181.  
81. Id. ¶ 187; see also Reinhard Quick & Andreas Blüthner, Has the Appellate Body 
Erred?: An Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case, 2 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 603, 617–18 (1999). 
82. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.  
83. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 526. 
84. Quick & Blüthner, supra note 81, at 617–19. The authors suspect that one of 
the AB’s motives for this move was to make the ruling “politically acceptable.” Id. at 
618. 
85. See, e.g., Alessandra Arcuri, Food Safety at the WTO after ‘Continued 
Suspension’: A Paradigm Shift?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GLOBAL EMERGENCIES: A 
LAW AND POLICY ANALYSIS 205, 208–12 (Antonis Antoniadis et al. eds., 2011); M. Gregg 
Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 825, 836 (2002); Caroline E. Foster, Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the 
World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 427, 427 (2008); Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a ‘‘Neutral Arbiter’’ for 
Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 198 (2003); David Winickoff 
et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 
YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2005); TRACEY EPPS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH 
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by the AB in its rulings and remains an open question. The track 
record following the AB’s decision in EC–Hormones indicates a 
cautious openness to undeterminable scientific factors, although 
scientific evidence has played—by far—the greater role.86 The 
AB’s ruling does however take account of the fact that the 
idealized and almost sterile version of science that the Panel—
somewhat naively—promoted was neither commensurate with 
the realities of scientific exploration in which non-scientific 
factors do play a role,87 nor the requirements of deliberative 
democratic forms of governance,88 nor did it appear cognizant 
of the complex interplay between various factors that create risks 
outside of the laboratory setting. 
1. Risk Assessment Stage 
The AB’s understanding of risk assessment as “a process 
characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective inquiry 
and analysis, that is, a mode of studying and sorting out facts 
and opinions” had been established since the original EC–
Hormones dispute89 and had been confirmed by the AB in United 
States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones 
Dispute (“US–Continued Suspension”).90 As laid out in the AB 
report in Australia–Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,91 the 
SPS Agreement distinguishes between two types of measures: so-
called quarantine risk, that is, “the likelihood of entry, 
                                                                                                             
PROTECTION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2008). It is arguable that, as Bloche claims, there is only a “low empirical 
barrier” to be crossed. Rather, the AB’s jurisprudence in Appellate Body Report, EC–
Hormones allows deference to domestic decision-making once substantial empirical 
barriers are overcome. Bloche, supra, at 837. 
86. See Seibert-Fohr, supra note 55, ¶ 27; Marcos A. Orellana, Evolving WTO Law 
Concerning Health, Safety and Environmental Measures, 1 TRADE, L. & DEV. 103, 122–26 
(2009). 
87. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, 
¶ 480–82 (finding relevant the institution in which an expert works and the possible 
effects thereof on the expert’s impartiality). 
88. See Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at 
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2343 (2000); Jacqueline Peel, Risk 
Regulation Under the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick? 
90 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper, Working Paper No. 02/04, 
2004), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/04/040201.pdf. 
89. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187. 
90. See Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 527.  
91. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶¶ 120–21. 
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establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory 
of an importing Member,”92 and so-called food-borne risks, that 
is, the “potential for adverse effects on human or animal health 
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.”93 
The AB was careful to point out the distinction between the 
“likelihood of entry” on the one hand and the “potential for 
adverse effects,” the former mandating a higher degree of 
certainty in that there must not only exist some abstract 
possibility of entry, establishment, or spread of diseases and 
associated biological and economic consequences, but also the 
assessment must—in either qualitative or quantitative terms94—
show the probability thereof.95 That being said, the AB has long 
held that this does not require meeting a particular “magnitude 
or threshold level of risk.”96 
The methods of risk assessment are outlined in Article 5.2 
and have been considerably supplemented by subsequent 
jurisprudence. As pointed out above, the AB declared early on 
that Article 5.2 does not represent a closed list, but rather that 
WTO members have a certain amount of discretion in choosing 
the methods for determining the risk that they have identified.97 
The AB has repeatedly reiterated this position since then, 
including in its latest report concerning the SPS Agreement.98 
Members also have discretion as to the so-called threshold level 
of risk that they are willing to accept before instituting their 
measures.99 This recognized the need for domestic decision-
makers to make decisions for which they could subsequently be 
held accountable. 
                                                                                                             
92 . SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4; see LUKASZ GRUSCZYNSKI, 
REGULATING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS UNDER WTO LAW 116 (2010). 
93. Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶8.36; SPS 
Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4. 
94 . Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 124; see also 
Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.  
95. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 123.  
96. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 186.  
97. See id. ¶ 187.  
98. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶¶ 207-08. 
99. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 125; Appellate 
Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124. 
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Despite later rulings on the panel stage to the contrary,100 
the AB has remained unambiguous regarding the nature of the 
inquiry a panel is supposed to perform: it does not exist to 
review the measures of WTO members de novo and therefore 
judge the substantive merits of an SPS measure; nor is its role to 
be fully deferential. 101  A panel does not—and the panel 
proceedings in US–Continued Suspension confirms this—have the 
required expertise to fulfill this role. Nor would its adjudicatory 
function be fulfilled if its review was fully deferential. Rather, its 
function is to conduct—in line with Article 11 of the DSU—an 
“objective assessment of the facts,” meaning to “determine 
whether [the] risk assessment is supported by coherent 
reasoning and respectable scientific evidence.”102 This means 
that minority viewpoints in science are valid bases for 
determining the existence of risk, as long as they possess the 
“necessary scientific and methodological rigour to be 
considered reputable science.” 103  Importantly for present 
purposes, the AB’s analysis in US–Continued Suspension makes 
direct reference to the peer review mechanism outlined above: 
such minority views “must be considered to be legitimate science 
according to the standards of the relevant scientific 
community.”104  
This then outlines the task of a panel. In light of what it 
learns by way of experts, its role is to determine whether the 
measure that a WTO member puts in place is sufficiently 
warranted by the evidence provided. This determination is 
obviously easier to make when the basis for a particular assertion 
is mainstream scientific thinking. It requires meeting minimum 
epistemic standards as defined by the “relevant scientific 
community,” for which it may solicit the assistance of experts in 
the field.105 It does not require putting forth the “best science,” 
                                                                                                             
100. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, 
¶¶ 7.562–7.572 (reviewing the evidence and determining it did not support the 
measures taken by the European Communities). 
101 . See id. ¶ 589. Previously, the AB had reached a similar conclusion in 
Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 117. 
102. See Appellate Body Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶¶ 589–
90. 
103. See id. ¶ 591. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. ¶¶ 591–92. 
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but rather an inquiry into whether the views expressed by a 
WTO member meet such a threshold.106 
Finally, a WTO member does not have to conduct its own 
risk assessment, but can base its measures on the results of 
scientific processes carried out by international organizations or 
other members.107 It does, however, have to be specific. What 
this means is that each substance that is considered to be a risk 
factor must be evaluated separately; it is not permissible to 
group substances together as the European Communities 
(“EC”) did in EC–Hormones. Rather, a separate assessment must 
be made for each substance in question with enough specificity 
as to the risks that each substance represents.108 It appears that 
the AB mandates more stringent requirements than what the 
text of the agreement demands. This is especially true for so-
called low-level risks, where the effect of a particular risk may be 
so low as to be almost undetectable. While the AB consistently 
declares that members can set their own levels of risk—at zero 
no less109—there are situations in which the risk a substance 
poses may not be ascertainable as specifically as the AB 
demands, and instead, scientists may only be able to point to a 
general risk associated with a particular substance.110  
This is especially troublesome as the AB does not fully take 
account of the multiplicity of sources from which a particular 
carcinogen may originate. It is thus insufficient to make the 
point that a particular substance is a known carcinogen and that 
residues of that carcinogen exist in meat. The AB would require 
more evidence showing a specific risk from hormone residues in 
the meat whose import was in question.111 While this line of 
argument is ultimately not convincing in light of the potential 
dangers that such substances may pose, the AB has at least two 
                                                                                                             
106. See id. ¶ 612. 
107. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 190. 
108. See id. ¶ 201.  
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and Why Risk Assessment Does Not Work: Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals as a Case in Point, 
2004 UTAH L. REV. 1305, 1322; see also Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, 
and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 364–65 
(2002). 
111. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 199.  
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arguments in defense of its position: WTO members may resort 
to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement112 to address such concerns 
(although questions remain about the heightened and arguably 
equally insurmountable hurdles there) and any other 
interpretation would open the system up to abuse, which in turn 
could pose a more systemic risk for SPS disciplines as it will 
almost invariably be possible to find a scientist to argue a 
particular point. 
2. Implementation Stage: Putting Risk Assessment into Action 
Given that the AB has consistently held that there is no 
distinction between risk assessment and risk management, there 
remain nevertheless questions over the implementation of the 
results of the—textually required—risk assessment. According to 
the AB this means that there must be an “objective 
relationship” 113  between the SPS measure and the risk 
assessment it is “based on.” Unlike the Panel, which had 
interpreted the wording “based on” as having to conform to the 
results of the risk assessment,114 the AB sees the requirements of 
this language as fulfilled when a measure is “sufficiently 
warrant[ed]” by the risk assessment. 115  The result is a 
requirement in which the AB demands a rational relationship 
between the risk assessment and the SPS measure.116 The SPS 
Agreement allows WTO members to choose their appropriate 
level of protection117 in its territory, regardless of whether such a 
measure leads to inefficiencies in international trade.118 The 
ability of a WTO member to rely on minority views in the 
process of assessing the risk further allows for considerable 
policy discretion.  
It is important to realize that the implementation is subject 
to a number of significant caveats. First, trade measures should 
be designed to minimize trade effects under Article 5.4, again 
                                                                                                             
112. See infra Part III.D. 
113. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 189. 
114. See Panel Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 31, ¶ 8.137; Panel 
Report, EC–Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶ 8.140. 
115. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 193. 
116. See Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 79. 
117. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 5. 
118. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 29, at 858. 
2011] LAW TALK V. SCIENCE TALK 175 
indicating the discretion of WTO members by employing the 
term “should” instead of “shall” or “must.”119 In addition, the 
SPS Agreement provides for the principles of non-
discrimination and proportionality.120 Both of these principles 
are arguably made effective in a moderate form, that is, it may 
not be possible for a member to achieve absolute consistency in 
the application of SPS measures when risks have to be combated 
expeditiously. 121  Further, the measure that a WTO member 
wishes to take must meet a form of proportionality testing, that 
is, measures that are reasonably available achieve the member’s 
chosen level of protection and which are significantly less trade 
restrictive than the contested measure.122 
As pointed out before, it is unclear to what extent non-
scientific factors may be taken into account in implementing the 
results of the risk assessment. The issue does not only arise in 
the case law, 123  but has attracted considerable academic 
commentary due to its contested nature. Without repeating the 
arguments,124 the debate surrounding this issue has an impact 
on the question at hand. Suffice it to say at this point that the 
impetus for some of the authors is neither the efficacy of 
scientific inquiry or the extent to which actual conclusions can 
be drawn, nor of how law and science interact. Their starting 
point may be that “the SPS Agreement was not drafted with the 
intent of being an environmental treaty”125  or one in which 
economic efficiency is viewed as superior to other—even 
potentially legitimate—concerns.126 
The AB has indicated in its EC–Hormones decision that it 
takes a broader view by indicating that the “available scientific 
                                                                                                             
119. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.4. 
120. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6. 
121. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 213.  
122. See Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 194.  
123. See Panel Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 10, ¶ 8.105; Panel Report, EC–
Hormones (Canada), supra note 37, ¶ 8.108. 
124. For an overview of the literature, see generally Warren Maruyama, A New 
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125. Neugebauer, supra note 124, at 1256. 
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evidence” is only a starting point and that the list in Article 5.2 is 
not a closed one.127 Its famous invocation of “the real world 
where people live and work and die”128 shows that it is at the very 
least cognizant that there may be other factors that can have an 
impact on governmental decision–making. 
D. The Meaning of Scientific Uncertainty and the (In)Sufficiency of 
Scientific Evidence 
The SPS Agreement recognizes that there may be instances 
in which sufficient scientific evidence is not available at a 
particular moment in time, yet nevertheless a WTO member, 
having set its own “appropriate level of risk” as low (or zero), 
concludes that there is a particular risk it wants to guard against. 
In such a situation, Article 5.7 operates as a “qualified 
exemption” to certain provisions of the SPS Agreement.129 While 
the precautionary principle may be “reflected” in Article 5.7, the 
provision does not serve as a ground for justifying otherwise 
WTO-inconsistent measures.130 Thus, under the circumstances 
laid out in Article 5.7, a WTO member may deviate from the 
disciplines of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 through 5.3. This reading 
leaves requirements such as non-discrimination and 
proportionality intact.131 
The preconditions for Article 5.7 are fourfold, the first two 
of which must be met before the adoption of a provisional 
measure, the latter two in order to maintain the provisional 
measures. There must be: (1) insufficient scientific evidence; (2) 
the measure is “adopted on the basis of available pertinent 
information;” (3) a WTO member invoking this provision must 
seek additional scientific information; and (4) the measure is 
subject to review within a “reasonable period of time.”132 
Provisional measures can thus only be put in place where 
there is, at the very least, some indication that a risk exists that 
may come to fruition. It is equally clear that the risk may never 
                                                                                                             
127. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 187.  
128. See id.  
129. See Panel Report, Japan Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 80. 
130. See Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 124.  
131. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6. 
132. See Appellate Body Report, Japan–Agricultural Products II, supra note 37, ¶ 89 
(quoting SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.7).  
2011] LAW TALK V. SCIENCE TALK 177 
materialize. That being said, Article 5.7 mandates that scientific 
evidence be “insufficient” and therefore neither covers 
situations in which there is scientific uncertainty as to the risk a 
member alleges,133 nor situations in which there is sufficient 
evidence to carry out a risk assessment.134 Rather, the rationale 
of Article 5.7 is to provide WTO Members with temporary 
respite from the SPS disciplines, provided that measures are 
maintained on a permanent basis only when sufficient scientific 
evidence can be provided.  
The AB addressed the question of insufficiency in Japan–
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, when it found that 
such a state exists when “the body of available scientific evidence 
does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the 
performance of an adequate assessment of risks.”135  In US–
Continued Suspension, the AB further elaborated on this 
requirement, clarifying that as long as there is a “qualified and 
respected scientific view that puts into question the relationship 
between the relevant scientific evidence and the conclusions in 
relation to risk, thereby not permitting the performance of a 
sufficiently objective assessment of risk on the basis of the 
existing scientific evidence,”136 WTO members may rely on such 
a point of view. This does not require the meeting of a “critical 
mass” standard that “call[s] into question the fundamental 
precepts of previous knowledge and evidence so as to make 
relevant, previously sufficient, evidence now insufficient,” as the 
Panel in US–Continued Suspension demanded.137 The AB rightly 
characterized such a requirement as a “paradigm shift,” that 
would be too high a threshold for the applicability of Article 5.7, 
pointing out that such fundamental shifts occur rather 
infrequently.138 The Panel’s approach may also be called into 
                                                                                                             
133. Panel Report, Japan–Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 184. 
134. See Peter-Tobias Stoll & Lutz Strack, Article 5 SPS, in 3 MAX PLANCK 
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question on a more fundamental level. Requiring that “the new 
scientific information and evidence must be such that they are at 
the origin of a change in the understanding of a scientific 
issue,” 139  displays that the Panel did not understand the 
foundation of scientific exploration. It is simply impossible to 
know “at the origin” whether such a change will in fact take 
place. It is precisely the role of provisional—or precautionary—
measures to determine this in light of potentially irreversible 
consequences. Thus, it is important—and the AB recognizes 
this—that a WTO member be able to point to deficiencies in the 
body of scientific evidence that call into question the drawing of 
objective conclusions. 
It should be noted moreover that the very term 
“insufficiency” is not amenable to a singular interpretation and 
may very well be context–dependent. This became evident in the 
panel report in EC–Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
when one of the experts described the situation in which 
national regulators may find themselves when having to choose 
between expediency and greater certainty. As the Panel pointed 
out: “[i]t is not always clear where the distinction lies between 
what regulators ‘need to know’ vs. what is merely ‘nice to 
know.’”140 
Any measure must be taken “on the basis of available 
pertinent information.” 141  The choice of “pertinent 
information” instead of “scientific evidence” already indicates 
that a member may use a broader set of sources than would be 
available under the requirements for a risk assessment set forth 
in Article 5.1. Clearly, the information “must be germane to 
conducting such a risk assessment.”142 As is the case in Article 
5.1, this information does not have to originate from the 
member, but can be taken from other members or international 
organizations. This requirement, however, serves to provide a 
“rational and objective relationship” between the risk that a 
                                                                                                             
139. Panel Report, US–Continued Suspension, supra note 37, ¶ 6.141. 
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member identifies and the provisional measure it wants to 
employ.143 
Once a provisional measure is in place, a WTO member 
invoking this provision must seek additional information in 
order to conduct an objective risk assessment within a 
“reasonable period of time.”144 It is therefore obliged to actively 
seek additional information to make up for the informational 
deficit that has led to the institution of the provisional measure 
in the first place and to review its measures on a periodic basis in 
light of the information available—ultimately leading to a 
member having to repeal a measure if no additional and 
“better” information can be found to support the imposition of 
the measure in question through the risk assessment process.145 
One of the questions that necessarily arises from these 
requirements is the nature and quality of the “additional 
information” that is to be obtained. The sole requirement 
appears to be that a member “seek[s] to obtain” more 
information.146 In EC–Hormones, the AB appeared to require a 
kind of roadmap in which the insufficiencies in the relevant 
scientific evidence are identified and how this insufficiency may 
be overcome. 147  These requirements appear uncontroversial. 
The AB requires governments to show that they continue to 
pursue information—ultimately in the form of scientific 
evidence—of a risk which they consider to be serious enough to 
deviate from the requirements of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
The reasonable amount of time given to WTO members 
depends on the case at hand, so that bright line rules have not 
been established. The AB was cognizant of the complex 
interplay of the cases that may arise when it pointed out that the 
specific circumstances of each case and the difficulty to obtain 
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additional information may differ from case to case.148 This may 
mean that, depending on the gravity of the risk at hand, a 
provisional measure may be sustained for a prolonged period of 
time, whereas this may not be the case for situations in which 
the potential for harm is negligible.149 The AB’s position is in 
line with its previous jurisprudence that gave governments 
considerable—though not unfettered—discretion when 
deciding whether to resort to precautionary and provisional 
measures when there is insufficient information to conduct a 
risk assessment.  
III. RISK AS A SCIENTIFIC UNDERTAKING: TRANSFORMING 
SCIENCE INTO LEGAL CATEGORIES 
This section addresses the question of how to “translate” or 
integrate the results of scientific inquiries into legal decisions. As 
shown above, the processes, procedures, and underlying 
philosophies of law and science differ considerably. At the same 
time, the SPS Agreement shows that science plays a pivotal role 
in the dispute settlement process concerning SPS measures. This 
is not a question that is confined to the realm of WTO law, but 
rather touches a large variety of areas in which law considers 
scientific conclusions. These conclusions may not be fully 
determinative, but at the very least highly indicative. This may be 
said for such diverse fields as environmental law, criminal law 
(e.g., DNA evidence), as well as tort law.150 
There are a number of schools of thought that have 
addressed this question, which is undergoing growth and 
complexity as scientific insight increases.151 It is also a field that 
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draws expertise from a large variety of other disciplines: science; 
science studies; economics; political science; sociology; 
humanities; ethics; psychology; and law. There are schools of 
thought that are based on rational choice scholarship, though 
their views on how legal conclusions can be based on scientific 
results varies considerably, and therefore it appears impossible 
to describe these schools of thought under one single rubric. 
Others schools of thought consider rational choice 
scholarship—by its nature—to be incomplete, and prefer, in 
situations of evidentiary insufficiency, to rely on the 
precautionary principle.152 Moreover, and partially overlapping, 
social science scholars have pointed out the need to take non-
scientific elements into consideration to a considerable extent 
when making potentially far-reaching decisions concerning the 
permissibility of governmental measures. 
It is self-explanatory that the delineation between these 
different schools of thought offered below is open to debate and 
that there exists considerable overlap between some of the 
approaches outlined below. Nevertheless, the categorization is 
designed to illuminate the differing approaches that can be 
brought to bear on this question—both generally when law and 
science interact, but also more specifically with respect to WTO 
law. Before turning to a description of these transmission 
models, it is helpful to briefly outline the concept of risk, what is 
understood by the term, how its extent can be determined, and 
what may lead to uncertainties about its extent.153 
A. What is Risk? 
Risk has historically been a subject of considerable interest, 
first developing in areas such as investment and gambling—
areas in which the participants have a great interest to 
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determine the payoff for a particular decision they are 
making.154 This approach to determining the potential negative 
impacts of any course of action was subsequently taken up by 
other fields such as insurance and engineering, each developing 
its own inquiries into how to understand risk. 155  What has 
emerged is a general understanding of risk that includes certain 
elements. This includes the likelihood of a particular risk 
multiplied by the gravity of the harm that would result. The 
resulting overall factor of risk is a probabilistic determination of 
a risk coming to fruition, involving a certain magnitude.156 This 
very thin description of the concept of risk does not contain all 
the elements that traditionally enter a risk determination. In 
addition, and especially in the natural sciences, factors such as 
variability and uncertainty play a role. The former is a testament 
to the fact that the responses individuals have to the exposure to 
an agent are different. The latter is recognition of the 
incompleteness of scientific data, which can stem from the 
existence of competing datasets, lack of perfect data, or 
competing theories of what conclusions are to be drawn from a 
dataset.157 
The result is usually a statement from scientific experts as to 
the existence and magnitude of risk, containing the following 
criteria: exposure to a particular agent involves the probability 
of adverse effects; these effects are variable depending on the 
individual who is exposed to the agent and will be given on a 
scale of probability including built-in buffers accounting for the 
uncertainty in determining the probability.158 This is the result 
of how science works, an aspect often misunderstood by non-
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scientists (including lawyers, judges and adjudicators): science is 
able to explain causal relations with a great deal of accuracy only 
in relatively simple analyses. The more variables a system has 
and thus the higher the degree of complexity (e.g., nuclear 
power plants or climate change), the more challenging if not 
impossible it is to prove with a high degree of certainty what is to 
be assessed. Any attempt at translating the results of this “view 
through a blurry window at the truth” must reconcile with this 
obstacle.159 It remains a matter of considerable debate whether 
non-scientific elements enter the determination of whether a 
risk exists,160 a question that is also dependent on whether the 
participants in the debate are experts or ordinary persons.161 
B. Rational Choice Models 
At one end of the spectrum are those that promote a purely 
probabilistic determination of risk and do not take into account 
the potential consequences that may arise. It is only a theoretical 
model and the view, in its pure form, is generally not held by 
authors. However, there are proponents of models whose own 
understanding is largely aligned with a considerable portion of 
this understanding of risk, while others prefer a more holistic 
rational choice model. 
1. Probabilistic Models 
Strong forms of risk determination rely on probabilistic 
methods which rely on quantitative analysis to arrive at an 
assessment of a particular risk. A classic example of this 
understanding is Chauncey Starr’s and Chris Whipple’s “Risks of 
                                                                                                             
159. John D. Graham & Lorenz Rhomberg, How Risks Are Identified and Assessed, 
545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 19 (1996). 
160. See infra Part V. 
161. Note the debate surrounding risk assessment is carried out by experts and by 
the public, with sometimes fundamental differences. See Slovic, supra note 4, at 281 
(providing empirical evidence for the different perceptions of risk by experts and the 
public); Roger E. Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and 
Attenuation of Risk, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 101 (1996) (noting the 
effect of ordinary people’s social amplification of risk). See generally Ann Bostrom, Risk 
Perceptions: “Experts” vs. “Lay People,” 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 101 (1997); HOWARD 
MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996). 
184 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:151 
Risk Decisions.”162 The core of their argument is that analysis is “a 
process based on collected data, anecdotal cases, and statistics, 
any of which may or may not be correct; and, based on these, we 
invent simplified models to predict an outcome.” 163  This 
projected outcome contains, as the authors admit, “a large 
uncertainty in the predictions,” yet they feel that their model is 
superior because of the importance of “improv[ing] the quality 
of decision-making.”164 
The role of risk analysis is not to be conflated with the role 
that decision-makers fulfill. However, the latter’s role must take 
into account intangible costs, but for whom proper risk 
assessment is essential. Difficulties exist in measuring these 
intangible costs, that may differ depending on who is being 
interrogated. This leads the representatives of this approach to 
not conduct an investigation into what they call the intuitive risk 
assessment involving perceptions about a risk (such as the 
dangers emanating from nuclear power plants), rather than 
scientific, probabilistic data.165  
2. Rational Choice Theory Meets Law: Law and Economics 
Various iterations of rational choice theory have found 
their way into the legal academy. Concerned with law’s reliance 
on intuitions about fairness and justice and—at least from 
today’s perspective—based on Ronald Coase’s highly influential 
1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost,” 166  a remarkably 
influential school of thought has emerged, especially in the 
United States.167 The proliferation of the rational choice theory, 
first developed in economics, has necessarily produced a large 
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number of subfields in legal academia and has sparked 
considerable revisions of the original model.168 At its core lies 
the inquiry of what choice a rational person will make given 
certain preferences. Because of the prevalence of rational 
choice theory in the fields of economics, sociology, political 
science, and law, the theory has had considerable influence not 
only in the way academics think about problems, but also in the 
policy field.169 In an informal way, rational choice theory posits 
that individual or group choice must be deliberative and 
consistent. 170  The premise for this view is a reasoned 
justification, providing the rationale for the choice made. 
Moreover, on the basis of this reasoning, it can be expected that 
the choice does not change inexplicably and the means chosen 
for the attainment of the goals pursued are reasonably well-
suited. 171  More convincing is the approach that posits the 
transitive nature of consumers’ preferences who seek to 
maximize the utility derived from such preferences. The origins 
of the theory explained consumer decisions, which are, to a 
large degree, quantifiable. Inherent in this approach is a 
reliance on empirical data on the basis of which decision 
making can be improved. Thus, when evaluating risk, rational 
choice theory, at least in the past, has encouraged the collection 
and subsequent dissemination of information so that “correct” 
decisions may be made. The advantage of this approach is, 
naturally similar to the previous model, that its results yield 
empirically confirmed predictions.  
Although these observations apply as much to the purely 
probabilistic school of thought outlined above, there are 
important objections that can be raised both with respect to this 
model as well as the previous one. For example, the market 
choices that the model was invented for are frequent and 
routine (such as purchasing toothpaste), whereas a decision 
over whom to marry or whether to permit hormone-treated beef 
to be imported into a WTO member’s territory is one of more 
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general applicability; prices for products are comparable as the 
market reflects consumer preferences through a specific price 
point, whereas it is more difficult to determine the price for 
intangible goods that can be valued differently by individuals. 
Finally, it is difficult to determine the optimal decision when 
non-market choices are involved and there may simply not be a 
correct choice; in these cases it may not be transparent what has 
led to a particular choice.172 
In the case of uncertainty or insufficiency of information, 
rational choice theory may not provide adequate prediction 
models either. As is the case in the natural sciences, the more 
complex a problem and the more variables involved, the less 
potent rational choice theory is. While purporting to avoid the 
biases that are inherent in decision making, rational choice 
theory’s starting point is what opens the approach to criticism. It 
presupposes unbiased decision making because of unbounded 
rationality and unbounded self-interest. 
3. Behavioral Economics, or: Cognitive Psychology 
Distinct from the representatives of law and economics just 
outlined are those, that while building on and refining the 
previous model,173 favor behavioral economics as a basis for 
decision making. Positing that the model of homo economicus is 
incomplete in that it ignores the contributions of cognitive and 
social psychologists, this approach places a higher emphasis on 
social, cognitive, and even emotional factors than does rational 
choice theory.174 It has also spawned a considerable amount of 
literature on the question of how to deal with risk and 
uncertainty.175 By and large, this literature has focused on how 
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individuals make decisions through the use of simplifying 
heuristics or shortcuts designed to make complex decisions 
simpler and more manageable.176 Such shortcuts are useful, as 
otherwise individuals would be overburdened by having to 
carefully analyze probabilities for every decision that they make 
throughout the day.177 However, in highly complex situations, 
these heuristics are inadequate to fully assess the risk that 
confronts an individual or society.178 
A concise version of this view can be described as follows: 
the availability of a danger in an individual’s mind may bring 
particular and familiar risks to mind at the expense of other, 
more salient ones (the availability heuristic); individuals often 
neglect risks that are highly salient in exchange for focusing on 
the worst case scenario (probability neglect); individuals are 
averse to change in the status quo (loss aversion); human-
induced risks are more suspect than the risks produced by 
nature (benevolence of nature); and people do not recognize 
secondary effects or risks that are not directly related to their 
own activity (system neglect).179 In this version of behavioral 
economics, rather than basing decisions on the precautionary 
principle, complex decisions are based on a narrow anti-
catastrophe principle, which is moderated by a cost-benefit 
analysis.180 This in turn may lead to a decision-making process 
that Cass Sunstein calls “libertarian paternalism.”181 
There are a number of principled objections to this 
approach.182 The “anti-catastrophe principle” that is brought to 
bear against the precautionary principle requires the 
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identification of all risks that a certain action may entail against 
the risk of inaction.183 The ability to assess these risks suffers 
from the same limitations as other approaches in that science 
may not be able to provide sufficient data to make an informed 
decision. Furthermore, the principle would not apply to 
situations where costs are high (for example climate change),184 
thereby rendering the principle inoperative in the situations 
that adjudicatory bodies often face. The same applies to the 
modified cost-benefit analysis that forms part of this analysis.185 
While the results of this analysis are not determinative—a 
departure from previously described versions of this more 
general school of thought—it remains unclear how precise the 
data for such an assessment can be.186 Sunstein’s proposed use 
of willingness-to-pay is an attempt to better demarcate the costs, 
but it is just as subjective and problematic at providing a value 
for harm that is spatially and temporally removed. An example 
of this would be climate change or any other complex problem 
the effects of which may only materialize after the passage of 
considerable time. 
C. Precaution-Based Jurisprudence 
A further step away from probability-based approaches is 
what may be termed precaution-based jurisprudence. The 
debate about the salience of the precautionary principle is an 
arduous one—this is not the place to describe it or the history of 
the precautionary principle in great detail.187 Suffice it to say 
that the debate has yielded a plethora of versions of the 
precautionary principle. On the one end of the spectrum are 
those who favor banning all technology that poses a potential 
negative health or environmental impact, even in situations 
where the probability of harm cannot be ascertained. On the 
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other end are those who argue against too prevalent a use of the 
precautionary principle as it may prevent innovation.188 
The more serious versions of the precautionary principle 
recognize the importance of scientific evidence at its core, but 
also take seriously that science has inherent limitations in what 
evidence it is capable of providing.189 This requires a careful 
delineation of the core elements of the precautionary principle. 
Otherwise, there is a considerable danger of arbitrary invocation 
of the precautionary principle by domestic governments.190 The 
situations in which the precautionary principle finds application 
are characterized by: (1) uncertainty about the occurrence of 
harm, especially in highly complex matters; (2) uncertainty 
about the risks of human behavior; and (3) the ability of 
governments to take action in the face of such uncertainties.191 
One feature of the precautionary principle is an inherent 
element of flexibility. It does not dictate a specific regulatory 
measure, but rather allows for a variety of measures to be taken 
by domestic governments. While it can support measures to 
protect the public from environmental and health risks, the 
precautionary principle is constrained by the requirements of 
proportionality, nondiscrimination, consistency, and a (not 
necessarily economic) 192  cost-benefit analysis. Importantly, 
precautionary principle statements often contain a verification 
element, that is, an obligation to further consider the situation 
that has triggered the reliance on the precautionary principle in 
the first place. 
The legal status of the precautionary principle remains 
unclear at this point, although it has been a contentious issue in 
WTO jurisprudence. The most that the AB has said so far is that 
                                                                                                             
188. Id.  
189. JACQUELINE PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 21–22 (2005). Some 
of the proponents of behavioral science do not shun the precautionary principle in its 
entirety, but do support a weak version of the precautionary principle. See, e.g., 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 179, at 117–22. 
190. For an example of this tension, see Annecoos Wiersema, Adversaries or 
Partners? Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Wildlife Treaty Regimes, 11 
J. INT’L WILDLIFE L.& POL’Y 211 (2008) 
191. Arie Trouwborst, The Precautionary Principle in General International Law: 
Combating the Babylonian Confusion, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY INT’L EVTL. L. 185 (2007). 
192. See Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM 
(2000) 1, ¶ 6(3). 
190 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:151 
the precautionary principle finds reflection in various provisions 
of the SPS Agreement and that, especially in cases where risks 
may be irreversible, “responsible, representative governments 
commonly act from perspectives of prudence and 
precaution.”193 Similar to other international bodies,194 the AB 
did not pronounce that the precautionary principle was a legal 
concept of universal application in international law.195 
In the WTO context, the precautionary principle has been 
most forcefully defended by the EC in cases concerning 
hormone-treated beef and the potential dangers of genetically 
modified organisms in food. The underlying idea for the use of 
the precautionary principle is that in the absence of scientific 
evidence linking growth hormones to the development of 
cancer in consumers, the EC was nevertheless basing its decision 
to ban meat treated with particular hormones on indications 
that such a risk existed. 
D. Risk Assessment as a Value-Dependent Exercise 
Finally, another school has emerged that emphasizes the 
importance of including social and cultural values in the risk 
assessment procedure. This approach has been discussed in 
more general terms for some time now196 and has received 
considerable attention in the WTO context.197 This school of 
thought argues that expert judgments are under particular 
scrutiny the more an issue is in the public eye.198 This may lead 
to unconscious influence on experts due to “pre-existing policy 
preferences,” media representations, or the mere exposure to 
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colleagues who may influence an individual’s risk perception.199 
Where stakes are higher, this issue is of even more concern: 
nuclear power is often cited as an example where cognitive 
dissonance is at its most visible, or at least all but unavoidable.200 
This is especially so in the context of what Alvin Weinberg calls 
“trans-science:” situations in which science may be able to ask 
the questions, but is unable to provide the answers because they 
involve the resolution of social problems that are not amenable 
to resolution through the procedures science has at its 
disposal.201 
In the context of the WTO this has led some authors to 
conclude that in the face of scientific uncertainty, a “WTO 
Member should be able to defend sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis that its population simply does not want 
to run a given risk.”202 This view is premised on decisions being 
made in a responsible fashion by democratically elected 
governments and following a deliberative process.203  Despite 
recognizing the potential for abuse, the majority of the 
proponents of this view remain committed to the idea that 
inherent elements of democracy justify this approach.204  
For one, some authors believe that social science research 
may mitigate unavoidable perception problems that may arise 
because of the politicization of issues, the potential 
disadvantageous treatment that foreign products may receive 
over domestic products purely on the basis of their foreign 
origin in governmental discourse, as well as the almost inevitable 
media bias that may arise in such situations.205 These objections 
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are countered with the importance of human life and health 
that may be at stake and are ameliorated with the requirement 
to show the proportionality of any measure in relation to the risk 
that a WTO member wishes to counter.206 
Whether the lack of importance attached to public opinion 
in the case law so far results in this question being “an open one 
at present”207 is debatable. The AB’s comment that the world is 
not a laboratory, but rather a place where “people live and work 
and die” is cryptic at best and can be interpreted in a multitude 
of ways. Combined with the AB’s finding that the list of factors 
that may be taken into account in conducting a risk assessment 
under Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement is not a closed one, the 
argument may be more powerful. But, at least to date, there is 
nothing in the case law to indicate that the dispute settlement 
organs are moving toward the inclusion of public opinion in 
assessing risk. Moreover, it may not always be clear whether 
governments use a genuine deliberative process in carrying out 
a risk assessment and the conditions under which a discourse 
takes place may already predicate the outcome. 
E. Pure Contextualist Understanding of Risk 
Less significant than the previous schools of thought is a 
purely contextualist understanding of risk that places equal 
importance on probability, voluntariness, and familiarity. This 
school of thought is more than just a step removed from a 
scientific understanding of risk. Rather, a host of attributes are 
taken into account, but none of them is considered essential; 
any one factor, including scientific evidence, may not play any 
role at all.208 According to this school of thought, risk may be 
equated with unfamiliarity and the language of risk used to 
express this sentiment with a particular product or process, 
because the use of a technology may not have been introduced 
                                                                                                             
Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002); Caroline E. Foster, Social Science Experts and Amicus 
Curiae Briefs in International Courts and Tribunals: The WTO Biotech Case, 52 NETH. INT’L 
L. REV. 433, 449–53 (2005); Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the 
Environment: Moving towards Consistency, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 285, 304–05 (2007). 
206. Foster, supra note 85, at 450. 
207. Id. at 444. 
208. See Thompson & Dean, supra note 151, at 369. 
2011] LAW TALK V. SCIENCE TALK 193 
in this societal context.209 This may be the case in situations 
where there is no measurable harm at all, but rather the term 
risk is used in what one may call non-technical, conveying 
unfamiliarity with the practice or technology that is under 
consideration. Important for present purposes is that the 
proponents of this view believe that “cultural and experiential 
inputs” have equal importance compared to the probabilistic 
model, which they describe as “reductionist, focusing on 
quantifiable variables.”210 
F. Summary 
It is clear that in the absence of clear scientific evidence, 
the results of the scientific inquiry must somehow be 
“translated” into the adjudicatory process. While risk assessment 
has inherent limitations, it has proven to be an indispensable 
tool in the decision-making process. It is capable of providing a 
more rational basis on which to make such decisions. 
Additionally, risk assessment provides the basis for 
administrative decision making in democratic states. When 
carried out responsibly, a risk assessment can respond to 
subsequent inquiry, it may be reviewed by others, and tested for 
accuracy. How such a translation is to take place depends largely 
on the importance of various factors, which, depending on one’s 
point of view, either form part of the risk assessment or should 
enter the process at a later stage. Different schools of thought 
hold divergent views on how to deal with scientific evidence that 
may not be sufficient. As has become clear, these transmission 
mechanisms exist on a continuum, ranging from purely 
probabilistic versions of risk assessment to those that are purely 
contextualist. 
Scientific evidence provides clear answers in only the rarest 
of circumstances. Its proper role is best understood as an 
attempt to determine the probability of harm given a set of 
predetermined conditions. Moreover, and crucially, science 
does not address the acceptability of the risk that may exist. This 
is ultimately a question for policy-makers. The next section of 
this Article addresses the manner in which these decisions have 
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been adjudicated in the context of the WTO and thus a 
pluralistic society. 
IV. WTO JURISPRUDENCE AND RISK: AN UNCOMFORTABLE 
RELATIONSHIP 
Panels and the AB have, at various times and in various 
compositions, had to handle questions of how and to what 
extent scientific evidence should be used in their decision-
making processes. In the context of translating the results of 
scientific inquiry into legal categories, WTO dispute settlement 
organs have a variety of different options they can choose from. 
The range is extensive and—to a certain extent—what road is 
chosen may predetermine the outcome of the case before a 
panel or the AB. Consciously or not, panelists or AB members 
fall into one or a combination of these categories. 
In a first step, it is useful to identify the schools of thought 
that do not find support in the language of the SPS Agreement. 
Neither purely probabilistic risk assessment nor the purely 
contextualist approach have found their way into WTO law. The 
very inclusion of Article 5.7 in the SPS Agreement—in which, 
according to the AB, the precautionary principle finds 
reflection—is a testament to the recognition that scientific 
inquiry is faced with inherent limitations. Similarly, the SPS 
Agreement’s insistence on showing “sufficient scientific 
evidence” is a testament to an approach that cannot be based 
purely on a culturally determined understanding of risk. 
 The relevant approaches thus range from rational choice 
theory to a values-based jurisprudence. Both the SPS Agreement 
itself and the jurisprudence to date can provide insights into 
what approach may be the most appropriate given the distinct 
languages that both science and law possess. There appears to 
be a disparity between the panels and the AB stage in 
adjudicating the SPS disputes to date. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, it appears that the panels’ track record has 
rarely reached beyond an approach that fits by and large the 
rational choice model. While panels paid lip-service to the 
jurisprudence of the AB, it is remarkable that, until the decision 
in EC–Hormones, panel reports have largely stayed uninfluenced 
by AB findings. The AB, on the other hand, has, beginning in its 
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very first finding on the SPS Agreement, hinted at giving WTO 
members considerable policy space.211 The reluctance of the 
panels—taken as a whole—is all the more remarkable given that 
the panel stage is designed as an organ without a great deal of 
permanency212 and is subject to appellate review.213 Unlike the 
AB, panelists are temporary adjudicators, called upon to serve in 
individual disputes.214 Thus, one can only speculate as to the 
reasons for the continued recalcitrance shown by the Panels on 
this issue. 
This distinction becomes clearer when juxtaposing the 
findings of the panels and the AB in various instances. While a 
full review of the cases is beyond the scope of this Article and 
moreover unnecessary, the following analysis shows the 
dichotomy between the approaches that the panels and the AB 
have taken. This rift has, if anything, widened under the 
decision by the AB in the US–Continued Suspension case. 
This distinction began early on in the disputes concerning 
the SPS Agreement—and at a fundamental level. The very first 
dispute brought to light the direction that the AB has followed 
ever since, by reversing the panel’s distinction between a stage of 
risk assessment and risk management.215 Not only did the AB 
point out that there was no textual basis for the distinction 
between two such stages, but it arguably felt that this delineation 
between a science-based stage and one in which non-scientific, 
political decisions were to be made was too neat a dissection as 
to comport with reality. 
Next, the AB, unlike the Panel in EC–Hormones, made clear 
that WTO members could not only rely on quantitative data in 
carrying out their risk assessment, but that the use of qualitative 
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data is also permissible.216 The AB thus again acknowledged that 
purely or even highly probabilistic risk assessments may not be 
able to capture the entirety of risk, but rather that there may be 
instances in which science has not yet advanced far enough to 
provide clear evaluations of how likely the realization of risk may 
be. Again, this potentially wide latitude of discretion was cabined 
through the requirement that there must be an “identifiable” or 
“ascertainable” risk, rather than merely theoretical 
uncertainty.217 
The AB found that the list of factors that may be taken into 
account in carrying out a risk assessment according to Article 5.2 
of the SPS Agreement is not a closed one.218 It did so from the 
very beginning and has continued to do so against panel 
findings which consistently imply that the list is at the very least 
limited to methods that lead to a probabilistic outcome.219 It may 
be unfortunate that the AB has not made a clearer 
pronouncement on what it considers to be the boundaries for 
factors that may be taken into account in carrying out a risk 
assessment. Two lines of demarcation can be drawn however. A 
risk assessment is at its core a scientific undertaking, which 
implies that an overly-contextualized risk assessment is not 
acceptable. At the same time, given the AB’s general approach 
to science outlined above overreliance on rational choice type 
methodologies is equally outside of the acceptable realm for the 
AB. 
These considerations are related to the question of setting 
the appropriate level of protection. As has been pointed out by 
the AB numerous times, it is the prerogative of the individual 
                                                                                                             
216. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 253(j); Appellate 
Body Report, Japan–Apples, supra note 37, ¶ 179; See Panel Report, EC–Hormones 
(Canada), supra note 37, ¶ 8.106. 
217. Appellate Body Report, Australia–Salmon, supra note 37, ¶ 125; Appellate 
Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶ 186; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: 
Health and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2004). 
218. Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, supra note 37, ¶¶ 187, 253(j). 
219. For an overview of the jurisprudence of the early SPS cases, see generally 
Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as 
Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes EC–Hormones, Australia–Salmon and Japan–Varietals, 
2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 641 (1999); see also Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
81, 91–99 (2000). 
2011] LAW TALK V. SCIENCE TALK 197 
WTO member to set the appropriate level of protection.220 WTO 
members do not enjoy complete discretion in this regard, as a 
member’s policy space is limited by the requirements of non-
discrimination and proportionality in Articles 5.5 and 5.6.221 
Nevertheless, the AB recognized that the appropriate level of 
protection can be set at zero.222 
Equally important, and divisive between some panels and 
the AB, has been the question of whether and if so, to what 
extent, it is acceptable for WTO members to rely on divergent 
scientific opinions in their risk assessment.223 In this context it is 
important to remember that the AB has reminded the panels 
numerous times that they cannot substitute their own 
considerations for the risk assessment of WTO members.224 The 
proper task for the panel is therefore not to attempt to find the 
“best science,” but rather to inquire whether the scientific 
methods used in the process of assessing risk are accepted in the 
relevant scientific community.225 It almost appears as if the Panel 
in EC–Continued Suspension was fighting a rearguard action when 
it suggested a requirement of “critical mass” of evidence in the 
context of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.226 When pressed for 
the origin of this standard, the Panel pointed out that the idea 
was prevalent in the sciences, especially in mathematics and 
physics.227 These findings were received with strong opposition 
by the AB, which made clear that it saw no basis for such a 
“critical mass” standard as it would almost by necessity require a 
paradigm shift in scientific discovery that, in the words of the 
AB, “is not frequent.”228 This may be the prime example of how 
a panel either misunderstood the process of scientific inquiry or 
understood scientific evidence as consisting of almost entirely 
probabilistic inquiries. As pointed out above, such a narrow view 
of science is not commensurate with the realities of scientific 
discovery. 
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Outside of the confines of the SPS Agreement, it has been 
argued229 that a further liberalization of the SPS disciplines 
could contravene the general rule contained in Article 19.2 of 
the DSU, which states that dispute settlement organs “cannot 
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements.”230 Whether this is indeed the case is open 
to debate. There is a difference between the rights and 
obligations that WTO members have and the expectations that 
WTO members derive from the agreements. It is certainly true 
that the panels and the AB do not enjoy unfettered discretion, 
but the degree to which this discretion can be exercised is 
debatable. This means that, taking the above spectrum as a 
yardstick, purely contextual approaches do not fit into the 
structure of the SPS Agreement. The same is probably true for 
the value-based jurisprudential approach as it also leaves too 
much discretion to member states. If the (not uncontroversial) 
goal of trade liberalization, with all its attendant costs and 
benefits, is to be taken seriously, then giving countries 
unfettered discretion to block trade is hard to reconcile with 
that goal. The AB recognizes not only the distinction between 
the languages of science and law as a technical challenge, but 
also recognizes that the role of adjudicatory bodies is to balance 
two competing objectives that are not only mentioned in the 
preamble of the SPS Agreement, but that are inherent in WTO 
law: the protection of human, animal or plant life or health on 
the one hand and trade liberalization on the other. 
CONCLUSION 
The interplay between science and law is more complicated 
than first meets the eye. And it is certainly more complex than 
the neat and clearly delineated world that law suggests. In the 
quest for legitimacy, the panels (as well as the AB in some 
instances, both within and outside the scope of the SPS 
Agreement) may have overlooked this complexity. There is a 
mismatch between law and science, a mismatch in which the 
former maintains a vision of the latter that is pure, seemingly 
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able to affirmatively determine social conflicts on an objective 
basis. It is a view that is far removed from any contemporary 
understanding within the field of science itself. As Robin 
Feldman puts it: “the problem is not only that science cannot do 
for law what we think it can, the problem is also that science is 
not even what we think it is.”231 Science is, however, “the best 
way to understand the way the world works” by “explaining 
physical, chemical, and biological processes” albeit with 
remaining “areas of ignorance.”232 
Leaving aside the question of the divergence between the 
territorially bound power of any legal system and the claim to 
universality that is inherent in science, some argue that 
“[r]egulatory decision-making cannot do without, but must not 
exclusively rely on, expertise and science.”233 This has been 
identified as a particular problem in multi-level governance 
systems and the WTO has been criticized for allowing global 
standards to be imposed through its decision-making process.234 
The AB recognized this when it found that risk assessment is not 
limited to the matters that are “susceptible of quantitative 
analysis by . . . empirical or experimental laboratory 
methods.”235 
Following a probabilistic or rational choice approach has 
neglected taking into account the richer dimensions of science, 
which do not exist independently from the society in which they 
operate. While this may be a lamentable state for some, the AB’s 
more nuanced approach is responsive to the intricacies and 
complexities of scientific discovery and is at least cognizant of 
the varying viewpoints over certain risks. Its jurisprudence, 
especially in EC–Continued Suspension, points in a direction in 
which the results of scientific inquiry play a significant role, but 
not to the exclusion of all other factors. The AB recognizes that 
science is inherently characterized by uncertainty. This 
uncertainty being part of the language and indeed the very 
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culture of science must have an impact on the policy arena and 
ultimately the legal arena as well. As pointed out by others, 
“[f]ailure to do so, by insisting on a single estimate of risk 
(whether the ‘best’ estimate or otherwise), does not fully and 
truthfully describe the state of science at any moment.”236 
Uncovering the different assumptions underlying the 
jurisprudence of the panels and the AB is therefore an 
important task. It was fortunate that the Panel in EC–Continued 
Suspension revealed its rationale when it required a “critical 
mass” standard for states to rely on when implementing a risk 
assessment. At the very least, the panel’s position allows for a 
discussion about the assumptions that the participants have 
when addressing highly consequential issues by making them 
public. 237  The resolution of these differences has real 
consequences in a world in which we “live and work and die.”238 
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